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Abstract—Smart metering infrastructure (SMI) is the core
component of the smart grid (SG) which enables two-way
communication between consumers and utility companies to
control, monitor, and manage the energy consumption data.
Despite their salient features, SMIs equipped with information
and communication technology are associated with new threats
due to their dependency on public communication networks.
Therefore, the security of SMI communications raises the need
for robust authentication and key agreement primitives that can
satisfy the security requirements of the SG. Thus, in order
to realize the aforementioned issues, this paper introduces a
lightweight and secure authentication protocol, “LiSA”, pri-
marily to secure SMIs in SG setups. The protocol employs
Elliptic Curve Cryptography at its core to provide various
security features such as mutual authentication, anonymity,
replay protection, session key security, and resistance against
various attacks. Precisely, LiSA exploits the hardness of the
Elliptic Curve Qu Vanstone (EVQV) certificate mechanism along
with Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman Problem (ECDHP) and
Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). Addition-
ally, LiSA is designed to provide the highest level of security
relative to the existing schemes with least computational and
communicational overheads. For instance, LiSA incurred barely
11.826 ms and 0.992 ms for executing different passes across the
smart meter and the service providers. Further, it required a
total of 544 bits for message transmission during each session.
Index Terms—Authentication protocol, Elliptic Curve Cryp-
tography, Smart Metering Infrastructure, Smart Grid, and
Security features.
I. INTRODUCTION
Smart Grid (SG) is the next-generation power system that
greatly enhances the reliability, efficiency and sustainability
of the legacy power systems with renewable energy sources,
distributed intelligence, and improved demand response fea-
tures [1], [2]. As opposed to the traditional grid, SG allows
a bi-directional flow of energy and information in order to
enable new functionalities among the consumers and utilities.
The smart metering infrastructure (SMI) is one of the crucial
application domains of SGs that helps in evaluating the
status of a power grid along with the management of the
distributed resources [3], [4]. In SGs, the smart meters (SMs)
connect power consumers to the utility company in order to
exchange, manage and control the energy consumption. They
rely on advanced information and communication technolo-
gies to support the intelligent power supply and enhance the
efficiency of legacy power systems [5], [6]. However, due
to the lack of inherent and effective security mechanisms,
interactions between legal entities are susceptible to cyber-
attacks [7], [8]. Nevertheless, the complex nature of the SG
and its diverse security requirements pose challenges to its
widespread adoption. Thus, it is necessary to provide secure
and reliable authentication systems for SMs that not only
maintain trust between the legitimate entities but also satisfy
other security services like mutual authentication, integrity,
and anonymity [9], [10].
In order to address the privacy issues of SMs, several
authentication schemes have recently been proposed. For
example, Diao et al. [11] introduced a privacy preserving
smart metering protocol that employs CamenischLysyanskaya
signature scheme for providing a secure and reliable authen-
tication system. This scheme constructs linkable anonymous
credential in order to provide message authentication and
traceability of faulty SMs. In a similar context, Yu et al.
[12] designed an information centric networking (ICN) based
approach; wherein a novel key management scheme was
employed in order to ensure the security in SMI. Simi-
larly, Abbasinezhad-Mood and Nikooghadam [13] devised a
lightweight communication scheme for SMs which employs
the hash and exclusive-OR operations in order to provide
confidentiality, real-time authentication along with the ability
to cope with one-minute or even less time intervals of
data transmission. Likewise, the authors in [14] employed
an identity-based non-interactive key distribution scheme to
develop a secure and scalable key distribution framework
for neighboring SMs. In order to provide compression and
authentication of smart meter readings in SMIs, Lee et al.
[15] introduced a unified approach based on the notion
of compressive sensing in a multicarrier system. Here, the
residual error of a received signal was used to determine
whether the signal is legitimate or not.
In 2018, Mustapa et al. [16] proposed an authentication
scheme for SMI; wherein ring oscillator physically unclonable
functions (ROPUF) were employed for deriving and storing
the cryptographic keys. In [17], Mohammadali et al. utilized
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) to propose an identity-
based key establishment protocol for SMIs. Likewise, Kumar
et al. [18] presented a lightweight authentication and key
agreement scheme in order to maintain the privacy in SMIs.
In an another work, Abbasinezhad-Mood and Nikooghadam
[19] developed an anonymous ECC-based self-certified key
distribution scheme for SGs in order to solve the issues
of public key infrastructure (PKI) maintenance and the key
escrow problem. Similarly, Braeken et al. [20] also pre-
sented a key agreement model for smart metering commu-
nications which aims to provide session key security under
the widely accepted Canetti-Krawczyk security model. The
authors asserted that their scheme provides identity-based
mutual authentication, credential privacy, and session key
security, along with the resistance against the well-known
attacks such as replay, man-in-the-middle, and impersonation.
Although several authentication and key exchange protocols
exist in the literature to provide security in SGs, most of them
not only fail to provide SM anonymity but also require high
communicational and computational costs. Thus, in this paper
a Lightweight and Secure Authentication (LiSA) protocol is
designed for securing SMIs.
A. Contributions
The key contributions of this paper are illustrated below:
• We propose a provably secure mutual authentication
and key agreement protocol named LiSA, specifically
for SMIs employed in SG environments. The designed
protocol leverages the hardness of the Elliptic Curve Qu
Vanstone (EVQV) certificate mechanism, Elliptic Curve
Diffie Hellman Problem (ECDHP), and Elliptic Curve
Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) in its design to
prevent various security attacks.
• Additionally, we provide a detailed informal secu-
rity evaluation of the proposed protocol. The evalua-
tion reveals that LiSA supports mutual authentication,
anonymity, replay protection, session key security, and
resists various other attacks.
• The proposed protocol is a perfect mix of security
features and lightweight cryptographic functions that
make it apt for deployment in SG ecosystems. Thus,
in order to validate it efficacy it has been extensively
evaluated against the current state-of-the-art in terms of
security features, computational complexity, and com-
municational complexity.
B. Organization
The present manuscript is structured according to the
following sequence. The proposed system model is sketched
in Section II and the designed protocol is presented in Sec-
tion III. Following this, detailed security analysis and perfor-
mance assessment of the proposed scheme are demonstrated
in Sections IV and V, respectively. Lastly, the conclusions are
drawn in Section VI.
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Fig. 1. A typical setup of LiSA.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A typical schematic diagram of the proposed LiSA protocol
is depicted in Fig. 1. The setup comprises primarily of
three entities, i.e., SMs, Service Providers (SPs), and Trusted
Third Party (TTP). SMs are resource constrained electronic
devices deployed across customers’ premises to record en-
ergy consumption on a periodic basis. Additionally, SMs are
also responsible for collecting and transmitting the energy
consumption data to the utility. On the other hand, SPs are
utilities that provide services to the end-users. Above all, TTP
is the trusted entity that initializes the system parameters and
aids in registration of SMs and SPs. Following this, mutual
authentication and key exchange is executed between the SMs
and SPs. The execution details of LiSA are elaborated in the
upcoming segment.
III. LISA: A MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION AND KEY
EXCHANGE STRATEGY FOR SMI
In the proposed scheme, the concepts of ECQV, ECDLP,
and ECDHP are exploited to establish trust and authenticity
between the SMs and SPs to resist different attack vectors.
The overall execution strategy has been segregated into the
following broad phases: i) Setup Phase, ii) Registration Phase,
and iii) Authentication and Key Exchange Phase [21], [22].
In summary, the by-product of the protocol is equivalent
to “mutual authentication”, while the end-product is the
“exchange of a secure session key”. The detailed information
is given below:
A. Phase I: Setup Phase
During this phase, the SMI is prepared for the subsequent
phases and incorporates the following course of actions:
Step 1: It begins with the selection of an elliptic curve E by
the TTP. The E is further associated with a generator P and
order q.
Smart Meter (SMA) Trusted Third Party
•Select IDA
•Select rA ∈ Z
∗
q
•Compute RA = rA.P
<IDA, RA> over secure channel−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
•Generate rT ∈ Z
∗
q
•Compute RT = rT .P
•Compute CertA = RA +RT
•Compute r = H0(CertA||IDA)rT + dT
<CertA, r> over secure channel←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
•Compute dA = H0(CertA||IDA)rA + r
•Compute QA = dAP
= H0(CertA||IDA)CertA +QT
Fig. 2. Phase II: Registration Phase.
Step 2: Following this, the TTP computes its private (dT ) and
public key (QT ) pairs. This is done in accordance with the
following equations: dT ∈ Z
∗
q and QT = dT .P .
Step 3: Next, a one-way hash function, i.e., (H0()) is selected.
Step 4: Finally, the above mentioned parameters including
< E,P, q,H0(), QT > are made public.
B. Phase II: Registration Phase
During this phase, the SMs and the SPs get themselves
registered with the TTP. The process of registration for both
the entities is exactly alike and is based on the ECQV
certificate scheme [20]. Thus, it is discussed in the case of
SMs only, but is extendable to the SPs as well. The execution
steps of the registration process are detailed in Fig. 2 and
discussed as under:
Step 1: The Ath SM starts its registration process by choosing
an identity (IDA) for its itself. Next, it selects a random
number (rA) and computes RA. Finally, the SM transmits
< IDu, RA > to the TTP using the secure channel.
Step 2: Upon receiving < IDu, RA >, the TTP selects
a random number rT and computes RT . It then computes
a certificate for the Ath SM using the following operation:
CertA = RA + RT . Following this, the TTP calculates the
value of variable r using H0(), concatenation, and ECC point
addition operations.
Step 3: Finally, the computed value of CertA and r are sent
to the Ath SM over the secure channel.
Step 4: Using the received values, the SM computes its private
key (dA) followed by its public key QA.
C. Phase III: Authentication & Key Exchange Phase
This is the most crucial phase of LiSA and incorporates
mutual authentication and session key exchange between the
SMs and SPs. The series of execution steps are reflected in
Fig. 3 and explained as follows.
Step 1: The process is initiated by the Ath SM by generating
its current time stamp (TSM ) and a random number (rSM ).
Next, it computes RSM and R
′
SM using ECC point multipli-
cation.
Step 2: Following this, the Ath SM computes an intermediate
token (ToSM ) using its CertA and IDA. It also calculates
an authorization token (AuthSM ) for the SP to verify using
the following operation: AuthSM = R
′
SM ⊕ ToSM ⊕ TSM .
Step 3: Next, < TSM , RSM , AuthSM > are transmitted to
SPB over the open channel. It is worth noting here that the
SM’s ID is never transmitted over the channel in clear text
format which prevents tracking of SM by the adversary A.
Step 4: Once < TSM , RSM , AuthSM > are received by
the SP, it validates the time stamp TSM . If found valid, the
SP proceeds; else the connection is terminated immediately.
Next, the SP computes R
′′
SM = dB .RSM ; followed by the
extraction of (CertA||IDA) from the received AuthSM .
Using the extracted values, the SP computes SMA’s public
key: QA = H0(CertA||IDA)CertA +QT . If the computed
key matches the publicly available QA, then the SP is sure
about the authenticity of the SM. Otherwise, the connection
is dropped by the SP.
Step 5: Next, the SP records its time stamp TSP and gen-
erates another authentication token (AuthSP ) for the SM
to verify. Simultaneously, the SP also computes a session
key (SKB−A) that is used only if the mutual authentication
is established. SKB−A is computed using the following
operation: kdf(IDA||CertA||R
′′
SM ||TSP ||TSM ) where kdf is
a key derivative function.
Step 6: Finally, the parameters < TSP , AuthSP > are
communicated to the SM for the next course of action.
Step 7: On receiving the above mentioned parameters, the
validation of time stamp TSP is done. Next, the authentication
token Auth∗SP is computed for verifying it against the re-
ceived token. A match indicates that the SP is a valid/authentic
entity.
Step 8: Finally, the SM computes the shared session key as
follows: SKA−B = kdf(IDA||CertA||R
′
SM ||TSP ||TSM .
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS AND COMPARISONS
In this section, detailed security analysis of the proposed
LiSA protocol is illustrated. Along with this, the comparative
security assessment against the existing schemes is also
presented herewith.
A. Security Analysis
LiSA provides a number of security features and resists
various attack vectors. The detailed information is illustrated
below.
1) Mutual authentication: LiSA supports the concept of
mutual authentication between the communication parties,
i.e., SMs and SPs. The process of mutual authentication
helps to establish the authenticity of one party to the other.
In the designed protocol, it is realised using two differ-
ent intermediate authentication tokens namely AuthSM and
AuthSP . The hardness of these tokens can be attributed to
ECQV and ECDHP [20]. In detail, these tokens cannot be
computed without the knowledge of CertA, IDA, and dB;
which are specifically private to the legitimate entities and
are not shareable.
Smart Meter SMA Service Provider SPB
•Generate time stamp TSM
•Select a random number rSM ∈ Z
∗
q
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•Compute R
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•Compute ToSM = (CertA||IDA)
•Compute AuthSM = R
′
SM ⊕ ToSM ⊕ TSM
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′′
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•Extract (CertA||IDA) = AuthSM ⊕R
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?
= Public Key of SM with IDA
If same, SMA is authentic; else disconnect
•Generate time stamp TSP
•Compute AuthSP = H0((R
′′
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⊕ TSP )
•Compute SKB−A =
kdf(IDA||CertA||R
′′
SM ||TSP ||TSM )
<TSP , AuthSP>
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•Validate time stamp TSP
•Compute Auth∗SP = H0((R
′
SM ||CertA||IDA)⊕ TSP )
•Check Auth∗SP
?
= AuthSP
If same, SP is authentic; else disconnect
•Compute SKA−B = kdf(IDA||CertA||R
′
SM ||TSP ||TSM )
Fig. 3. Phase III: Authentication & Key Exchange Phase.
2) Replay protection: Resistance against replay attacks
enable the protocol to deny any previous message to re-
transmitted between the legitimate parties. In the proposed
LiSA protocol, replay protection has been provided using
the concept of time stamps and pseudo random numbers.
These time stamps and numbers enable new values to the
intermediate tokens in every session. Further, during every
session, the time stamps are verified for their validity. In case
of violation, the ongoing communications are terminated to
avoid replay attacks.
3) Resistance against impersonation attacks: The pro-
posed protocol also resists impersonation attacks. This implies
that an adversary A cannot impersonate a valid SM to form
a legitimate session with the SP. This can be credited to
the strength of the ECQV certificate mechanism and the ID
masking mechanism that prevents an A to track SMs and
spoof their identities. Further, extraction of a SM’s certificate
and identity from AuthSM is an intractable process for an A.
This is because, these values can only be extracted by a valid
SP (say SPB with which the SM is trying to connect) with
its respective private key dB .
4) Resistance against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks:
The MITM attack allows an A to intercept a legitimate
session and spoof the identity of an entity. Following this, A
alters the relayed messages to illegitimately develop a session
with the SM/SP. However, as explained earlier, LiSA resists
impersonation and replay attacks. Further, the alteration of
AuthSM and AuthSP tokens is also not possible in the
proposed scheme. Thus, LiSA prevents MITM attacks.
5) Supports anonymity: LiSA also support perfect
anonymity for the participating SMs. This is achieved by
masking the SM’s identity and certificate information while
trying to develop a session with the SPs. Precisely, the SM’s
confidential information such as CertA and IDA are never
relayed in clear text format. Further, their extraction from the
intermediate tokens by an illegitimate party is an intractable
process. This can be attributed to the hardness of ECDLP
[20].
6) Session key security: The session keys (SKA−B and
SKB−A) derived by the SMs and SPs in LiSA are completely
secure. The session keys can only be computed by the valid
and authentic parties post successful mutual authentication as
discussed in Section III-C.
7) Resistance against Denial of Service (DoS) attacks:
In LiSA, the process of mutual authentication is essentially
initiated by the SM by relaying the following message:
<TSM , RSM , AuthSM>. Post receiving this message,
the SP makes checks i) the validity of the received time
stamp TSM followed by ii) the authenticity of the SM using
AuthSM . In the course of this process, if any validation check
fails, then the SP knows that the other party is illegitimate.
Thus, the connection is immediately dropped to prevent DoS
attacks.
B. Security Comparison
This sections presents the detailed comparison between
the proposed LiSA protocol and the existing schemes [19],
[20], [23], [24]. The comparison is carried out on the basis
of following features: mutual authentication (SF1), replay
protection (SF2), resistance against impersonation attacks
(SF3), resistance against MITM attacks (SF4), anonymity
(SF5), session key security (SF6), resistance against DoS
attacks (SF7), and lightweight (SF8).
TABLE I
ANALYSIS OF SECURITY FEATURES.
Protocol [23] [24] [19] [20] Proposed
SF1 X X X × X
SF2 X X X X X
SF3 X X X X X
SF4 X X X X X
SF5 X X X X X
SF6 × × × X X
SF7 × × × X X
SF8 × × × × X
It is evident from the comparison shown in Table I that the
proposed LiSA protocol is the most secure out of the existing
schemes. For instance, Odelu et al.’s [23], Chen et al.’s [24],
and Abbasinezhad-Mood & Nikooghadam’s schemes [19] fail
to provide session key security and resistance against DoS
attacks. Additionally, these protocols are not lightweight in
comparison to the other protocols. Finally, Braeken et al.’s
scheme [20] neither provides mutual authentication nor is
lightweight.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, the comparative analysis of the proposed
LiSA protocol is carried out against the current state-of-the-
art [19], [20], [23], [24]. The related comparisons have been
performed on the basis of total computational and commu-
nicational complexities associated with these protocols. The
detailed information about these assessments and the related
simulation parameters are discussed herewith.
A. Simulation Details
Braeken et al.in [20] adopted an efficient means to simulate
the SG setup and evaluated different protocols on it. In
the said setup, the authors employed a personal computer
to mimic the computational capability of the SPs; while a
constrained device was used to represent a SM. The config-
urations of SPs included Windows 7 running on 2.5 GHz
CPU and 8 GB RAM. On the other hand, SMs had limited
capabilities with a single core 798 MHz CPU and 256 MB
RAM.
B. Evaluation Parameters
For the evaluation of the proposed LiSA protocol in com-
parison to the existing protocols, the following metrics have
been chosen:
1) Computational Overhead Analysis: The computational
time of the proposed and existing protocols have been com-
puted by taking into consideration the number of computa-
tionally expensive cryptographic operations executed during
the authentication and key exchange phases. Table II illus-
trates the computational time (in ms) required for executing
different functions on the SMs and SPs, respectively. Here,
Tb,Tm,Ta,Th, Te, and Ts refer to the execution time for per-
forming bilinear pairing, point multiplication, point addition,
hashing, modular exponentiation operation, and symmetric
encryption/decryption operation, respectively.
TABLE II
EXECUTION TIME OF DIFFERENT CRYPTOGRAPHIC FUNCTIONS.
Entity Tb Tm Ta Th Te Ts
SP 17.01 0.986 0.004 0.001 0.874 0.033
SM 9.23 5.9 0.004 0.026 7.86 0.079
In accordance with the values depicted in the above table,
the computational complexities of different protocols have
been computed. The related outcomes are shown Table III;
wherein the overheads on the SMs and SPs are depicted
separately. The proposed LiSA protocol requires 11.826 msec
on the SM level and almost 0.992 msec on the SP level, for
executing the authentication mechanism along with the key
exchange. Additionally, the said execution time is the least in
comparison with the other protocols as evidenced from the
results shown in Table III.
TABLE III
AN ILLUSTRATION OF COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS.
Protocol At SM At SP
Odelu et al. [23] 3Tm + Ta + Te +
6Th ≈ 25.72
2Tm + Ta + 2Tb +
Te + 6Th ≈ 37.28
Chen et al. [24] 2Tm + Te + 5Th ≈
19.79
3Tm + Tb + Te +
5Th ≈ 21.26
Abbasinezhad-
Mood [19]
4Tm + Ta + 5Th ≈
23.80
4Tm + Ta + 5Th ≈
3.98
Braeken et al. [20] 4Tm + Ta + Ts +
5Th ≈ 23.81
4Tm + 2Ta + Ts +
5Th ≈ 3.99
Proposed 2Tm +Th ≈ 11.826 Tm + Ta + 2Th ≈
0.992
2) Communicational Overhead Analysis: In order to anal-
yse the communicational complexity of the proposed and the
existing protocols, the number of messages and bits transmit-
ted between the SMs and SPs have been considered. For this
analysis, the transmitted messages have been segregated into
different tokens with variable lengths. For instance, the length
of the hash function and random numbers is equivalent to 160
bits, while the length of the identity field and time stamps
are set to 32 bits each. Further, the x-coordinate of an ECC
point requires 60 bits. Likewise, the message length of other
tokens can be found in the literature [20]. Consequently, the
communicational overheads associated with the transmission
of different tokens across the authentication and key exchange
mechanism are summarized in Table IV. It is quite clear from
the obtained results that LiSA requires the least number of
rounds and number of bits to establish trust, authenticity and
secure session key between the communicating parties. In
detail, LiSA requires 2 rounds and 544 bits for transmission
of messages between the SMs and SPs.
Thus, it can be summarized from the above discussion
that LiSA is the most secure and lightweight authentication
scheme for SMIs in SG setups.
TABLE IV
AN ILLUSTRATION OF COMMUNICATIONAL COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS.
Protocol Number of Rounds No. of bits
Odelu et al. [23] 3 1920
Chen et al. [24] 3 1632
Abbasinezhad-Mood [19] 3 832
Braeken et al. [20] 3 832
Proposed 2 544
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a provably secure mutual authentication and
key agreement protocol named LiSA was devised, specifically
for SMIs employed in SG environments. The proposed pro-
tocol is a perfect mix of security features and lightweight
cryptographic functions that make it apt for deployment in SG
ecosystems. In order to attain the above mentioned features,
the designed protocol utilizes ECC, one-way hash functions,
concatenation, and logical XOR operations. In terms of ECC,
the protocol leverages the concept of ECQV, ECDLP, and
ECDHP to generate the intermediate tokens including au-
thentication tokens and session keys. Further, the detailed
security assessment of the protocol reveals that it supports
various security features namely mutual authentication, replay
protection, anonymity, resistance against MITM, DoS, im-
personation attacks, etc. Additionally, the computational and
communicational overheads associated with the execution of
the designed protocol in SG setups indicate that it is relatively
lightweight in comparison with the current state-of-the-art.
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